When Lebanon asked U.S. mediator Amos Hochstein in June 2022 to begin indirect talks with Israel over maritime boundary delimitation, the regional context was markedly different. At the time, Israeli priorities leaned toward economic interests — ensuring access to offshore gas — while Europe sought alternatives to Russian supplies after the war in Ukraine. Those economic drivers made a negotiated settlement plausible: Israel wanted to avoid a conflict that could threaten its energy projects, and Hezbollah lacked appetite for a protracted “rights war” while Western interests aligned with Israel.
Today the situation has shifted. Lebanon seeks indirect negotiations with Israel to recover occupied land, secure the return of detainees, halt targeted killings and strikes, and allow residents of southern frontline villages to return home and rebuild. Beirut wants a clear, verifiable withdrawal of Israeli forces and the removal of the “red zone” created by recent hostilities.
But does Israel have an interest in indirect talks that could culminate in a security and border agreement if it already enjoys freedom of military action inside Lebanon and faces no actor capable of restraining it after the latest war? The answer, the piece argues, is no. Israeli demands extend beyond narrow security and boundary arrangements; they envision a comprehensive pact that would draw Lebanon into broader regional normalization accords. Consequently, Israel would accept indirect negotiations only if they serve as a prelude to direct talks — and that, the article says, is conditional on two parallel achievements: the disarmament of Hezbollah and a reconstruction plan that excludes the movement from participation or benefit.
Given Lebanon’s current political realities, those conditions are unlikely. The government lacks the will or capacity to use force to disarm Hezbollah; the party will not accept measures that amount to stripping it of its armed capability; and with Hezbollah present in government and allied with the Amal movement, passing a reconstruction plan that sidelines the party is politically fraught.
Absent a dramatic, late-stage change in circumstances, the article contends, the only remaining path to such an outcome would be another round of conflict that creates new battlefield and political facts to compel Hezbollah’s acquiescence. French and American diplomatic efforts aim to avoid that scenario, but planners do not expect such a decisive shift before the end of the year — a deadline Lebanon set itself on August 5 to complete weapons withdrawal across the country.
Inside Lebanon, political contacts are active, trying to persuade Hezbollah to spare the country another ruinous war. The article closes on a sober note: without either domestic political breakthroughs or a miracle in the eleventh hour, the prospects for indirect negotiations that achieve a lasting security and border settlement look slim.
